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Abstract-h this note, an extended version of the Zhou and Chen minimax inequaiity is obtained 
for reflexive Banach spaces. An application of the result to the existence of Nash equilibrium points 
without assuming that cost functions are convex is given. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
For an N-person game in which the strategy sets are closed, convex, possibly unbounded subsets 
of reflexive Banach spaces, Williams [l] has obtained sufficient conditions for the existence of a 
Nash equilibrium point. These conditions require that the players’ costs satisfy certain convexity, 
weak semicontinuity, and coercivity conditions. Recently, Yu [2] has proved that nash equilib- 
rium points exist under weaker conditions than those of Williams by employing the famous Ky 
Fan minimax inequality [3]. In th is note, an extended version of the Zhou and Chen minimax 
inequality [4] is obtained for reflexive Banach spaces. As an application of the result, we prove in 
Theorem 2 that Nash equilibrium points exist without assuming that cost functions are convex. 
It will be seen that Theorem 2 generalizes corresponding results of William [l, Theorem 2.11 and 
Yu [2, Theorem 3.11. 
2. EXTENDED VERSION OF THE ZHOU AND CHEN MINIMAX INEQUALITY 
Let E be a locally convex topological vector space with dual E’, and let K be a nonempty 
convex subset of E. For any given A C E, ConvA denotes the closed convex hull of A. Let 
f : Ii’ x K - R U {+co, -w). The function f(z, y) is said to be quasi-concave in y for every 
given 2 if for any finite subset {yi, . . . , ym} c A’ and any yo E Conv{yl,. . . , y,,,}, we have 
for any 2: E K. The function f(z, y) is said to be y-diagonally quasi-concave in y [4] for some 
7 E R U {+oo, --CO}, if for any finite subset (yi, . . . , y,,,} c K and any ys E Conv{yr,. . . , y,}, 
we have 
min {f(YO, Yi)) I 7. 
l<i<m -- 
In particular, if f(z, y) is quasi-concave in y for every given 2 E K, then p(z, y) is y-diagonally 
quasi-concave in y with 7 = ;z; j(z, z). 
THEOREM 1. Zet K be a nonempty closed convex set in a reffexive Banach space B, and Jet f 
be a real-valued function defined on Ji x K such that: 
(i) For each fixed y E Ii’, j(z, y) is a weakly lower semicontinuous function of z on K. 
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(ii) 
(iii) 
J.-C. YAO 
For each fixed x E K, f(x, y) is y-diagonally quasi-concave in y. 
There is an increasing sequence of nonempty, closed, bounded, convex subsets of K such 
that U,“=, I(,, = K and for each sequence x, E I(,, llznll --+ +oo, there is a sequence 
yn E I;, such that 
limsup f(~, yn) > 7. 
n-+&Z 
Then there exists a point I* E K such that f(x’, y) 5 7 for all y E K. 
PROOF. For each n, since I<,, is nonempty, closed, bounded and convex, it is a weakly compact 
and convex subset of I(. Consider f on K, x I(, , by [4, Theorem 2.111, there exists xn E K, 
such that 
sup f(%, Y) I 7. (I) 
YEK, 
We claim that the sequence {x,} is bounded. Suppose that the contrary is true. We may without 
loss of generality assume that llxnII + + co. Then by (iii), there exists a sequence Yn E K,, such 
that 
limsup f(x,, yn) > 7. (2) 
7&-W 
But by (1) we have f(xn, y,,) 5 7 for all n and thus, limsup f(x,, yn) 5 7 which is a contradiction 
n-W 
to (2). Hence, the sequence {x,,} is bounded as claimed. 
Since {x,,} is bounded, we may without loss of generality assume that the sequence (2,) 
converges weakly to some x* E K. For each y E K, let m be such that y E I(,. Then y E Kn 
for all n 1 m. It follows from (1) that I( x, , y) 5 7 for all n 2 m. Consequently, 
f(x*,v) 5 linm_i~ff(h,Y) 5 7 
and the proof is completed. 
REMARK 1. In [2, Theorem 2.11, f(x,y) is assumed to be quasi-concave in y and f(x,z) = 0 
for each x E K. As a result, f (x, y) is O-diagonally quasi-concave in y for each x E K and 
condition (ii) of Theorem 1 is satisfied. Therefore, Theorem 1 slightly improves [2, Theorem 2.11. 
3. N-PERSON GAMES WITHOUT CONVEXITY 
In this section, we shall employ Theorem 1 to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium points 
without assuming that cost functions are convex. 
Let I = {l,.. . , N}. For each i E I, let Si be the strategy set of player i. Let Ji : I( = 
ny=, Si -+ R be the cost function of player i. For each i E I, denote 
; I 
2X- . > 
2 
2; = {Xj}j;ti, ST = J-Jsj. 
i#i 
THEOREM 2. Suppose that, for each i E I, Si is a nonempty closed convex subset of a reflexive 
Banach space Et and that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(9 The real-valued function f(r, y) on I< x Ii’ defined by 
f(~,Y)=~~~~(xi,x;)--J,(Yi,xi)l 
i=l 
(ii) 
is O-diagonally quasi-concave in y. 
For each i E I and each fixed xi E Si, Ji is a weakly upper semicontinuous function of X; 
on S;. 
(iii) 
(iv) 
‘& Ji is a weakly lower semicontinuous of x on K. 
For each sequence (xy, . . . , x;) E K such that 11(x?, . . . , xk)II = CE, llx~lli + +CO, there 
exists i E I and wi E Si such that 
limsup[Ji($,xf) - Ji(wi,xy)] > 0. 
*-oo 
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Then there exists a point (xi, . . . , cc;) E I< such that 
Ji(Z?r, XT) = “Xiii Ji(Ui, Xr)* 
8 I 
PROOF. We essentially follow the argument of Yu [2]. For each positive integer n, let 
K” = ((17,. . . , zk) E K : 1)2i)lj 5 12, for all i E 1). 
We may suppose that K, # 0. Then I<, is an increasing sequence of nonempty, closed, bounded, 
convex subsets of Ii such that U,“=, K, = K. Let zn = (zy, . . . , xk) be a sequence in K such 
that ]](zy,. . . , zk)ll + 00. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that 2” E K,. There 
exists m such that ]]u+]] 5 n for all R 2 m. Let 
yn = xn, if n<m, 
yn = (wi,zp) E K,, if n>m. 
Then 
limsup f(x”, y”) = limsup[Ji($, Xg) - Ji(zui, XF)] > 0. 
n-CO n-03 
By Theorem 1, there exists a point x* = (xi,. . . , xk) E A’ such that 
f(X’l Y) I 0, for all y E K. 
For each i E I and any ui E Si, let y = (pi, x;t ) E K. Then we have 
f(x*,y) = Ji(Xf,XT) -J&4&) 5 0. 
Therefore, 
Ji(XIj Xi) = $lii Ji(Ui, Xf). 
I I 
REMARK 2. In [2, Theorem 3.11, Ji is assumed to be a quasi-concave function of xi on Si 
for each i E I and each x; E Sri. In this case, f(x, y) in Theorem 2(i) is a quasi-concave 
function of y on I<. Also, since f(x, z) = 0 for each I E I<‘, f(x, y) is O-diagonally quasi-concave 
in y for each x E I<. Hence, condition (i) of Theorem 2 is satisfied. Therefore, Theorem 2 
improves [2, Theorem 3.11. As [2, Theorem 3.11 extends [l, Theorem 2.11, Theorem 2 also 
generalizes [ 1, Theorem 2.11. 
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